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INTRODUCTION: 
THE MANY FACETS OF PRECAUTIONARY LOGIC 
The collection of contributions to this issue of Erasmus Law Review
illustrates the breadth of the academic writing on the theme of precaution. 
Only the article by Trouwborst can be considered to belong to the original 
domain of the legal discourse on the precautionary principle (PP) as a 
principle of international environmental law. The rest of the contributions 
clearly show that other disciplines have become involved as well. 
This broadening of academic interest in precaution can be explained 
by the fact that the application of the PP is often highly contested. The 
European Union’s claim that the PP is a received principle of international 
environmental law is problematic, at least in the sense that questions of when 
and how to apply it always give rise to considerable controversy. The PP can 
therefore be considered a ‘contested concept’. It is true that the PP can be 
found in many international treaties, but it is equally true that all treaties use 
different words to state the meaning. In fact, many legal scholars deplore this 
lack of uniformity. The jurisdiction of courts thus far has not improved this 
state of affairs, as Marchant and Mossman have shown for the EU court.1
Cases where the application of the PP is suggested are highly 
controversial in political, moral, and economic terms. The proof of success 
for legal concepts, principles, and rules is their routinisation. Their meaning 
becomes standardised and their application a matter of everyday habits. 
Regardless of the fact that it is carried out by professionals, habitual 
application is always unreflective. The precondition for this kind of 
unreflective application of legal concepts is their successful depoliticisation. 
Only then may concepts become part of our ‘mental furniture’ and thereby 
enter ‘the world taken for granted’, which is populated with routines and 
habits.  
When controversy remains, depoliticisation and therefore 
routinisation is impossible. The contributions to this issue demonstrate that 
the PP certainly remains contested in its meaning, in its domains of 
applicability, and in its mode of application. This is partly the case in all 
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instances where we try to deal with risks. As Douglas and Wildavsky have 
stressed previously, risk and morality are strongly connected.2 To name a 
certain risk is to state who is the victim and who is the perpetrator. This 
positioning depends on decisions about what can be considered damage and 
who is responsible for preventing it. We also need to decide who suffers the 
damage and whether they can be considered to be blameless victims 
deserving of protection and compensation. It is obvious that this kind of 
question is hard to answer and that the answers will always be contested. 
Our societies are proud to be democracies governed by the rule of 
law. In such a context, political controversy should be – seen to be – 
resolved by arguments. This need for arguments in the public and political 
arena explains why precaution is discussed in many diverse disciplines. 
Much work in the legal domain centres on achieving consensus on the 
meaning and correct application of the PP. Trouwborst in particular has tried 
to deduce the ‘true core’ of the PP from an analysis of treaties and 
jurisprudence.3 In his present contribution, he continues his quest for 
conceptual clarification by exploring the relation between the PP and ‘the’ 
principle of prevention. His conclusion that adaptation of the PP renders the 
principle of prevention obsolete is provocative and will predictably inspire 
further discussion.  
Given the fundamentally controversial nature of precaution, the 
successful standardisation of the PP is not likely to happen in the near future. 
However, two Dutch advisory bodies published reports in 2008 that can be 
seen as attempts to depoliticise the PP. This is especially true for Precaution 
with Reason by the Health Council of the Netherlands.4 The committee that 
prepared this report was chaired by Charles Vlek, whose personal 
contribution to this issue reflects a similar attempt. From a decision-
theoretical perspective, Vlek offers an elaborate conceptualisation of the PP. 
In this elaboration, precaution loses its connection with environmental 
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protection, which according to Trouwborst remains the core of the PP as a 
principle of international law. In fact, the PP has scarcely any connection to 
specific material domains in Vlek’s conceptualisation, notwithstanding the 
fact that the Health Council advised specifically on the application of the PP 
in the domain of public health. Vlek proposes a PP that is mainly of a 
procedural nature. To act in a precautionary way is to act in a carefully 
considered fashion that allows all relevant parties and interests to fully 
participate in the decision-making process. Vlek incorporates much of the 
criticism that is directed against the PP by stressing that the costs and 
benefits of all relevant policy options in the case at hand should be 
considered carefully.  
The relevance of discourses concerning the PP for criminal law has 
become widely accepted since Jessica Stern pointed to the precautionary 
nature of the way the Bush administration responded to 9/11.5 The most 
elaborate attempt to show this relevance comes perhaps from Richard 
Ericson, whose Crime in an Insecure World inspired this issue on 
precautionary logic.6 Borgers and Van Sliedregt, both professors of criminal 
law, discuss the PP in this context.7 Following Sunstein’s criticism of the PP 
in Laws of Fear, they focus especially on his idea of an ‘anti-catastrophe 
principle’.8 After describing the counter terrorism measures that several EU 
countries introduced in their criminal law, they conclude that these ‘are all 
centered around the notion of “prevention”.’ They agree that such measures 
may be criticised for being driven too strongly by fear and for introducing 
risks for the civil rights of citizens. However, they stress that such criticism 
easily overlooks the importance that citizens attach to safety and security. 
Their analysis of Sunstein’s anti-catastrophe principle in this context results 
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in a proposal that emphasises the need for a decision-making process in 
which the pros and cons of changes in the criminal code are considered 
carefully. In this sense, their contribution is similar to Vlek’s. It would seem 
likely that Borgers and Van Sliedregt consider Vlek’s proposal promising for 
application in this context. 
As Ericson and O’Malley show, the PP is relevant for analysing 
developments in criminal law outside the attempts to counter terrorism.9 
However, this domain remains the clearest example of the application of 
precautionary logic in the realm of criminal law. Developing his argument 
from Invitation to Terror, Frank Furedi analyses the ‘precautionary culture 
and the rise of possibilistic risk assessment’. His contribution is highly 
critical in claiming that the application of a precautionary logic leads to an 
attitude towards the future that makes us fear that anything and everything 
may go wrong. Here his analysis runs parallel to a common theme in 
discussions about precaution, where uncertainty is stressed beyond the limits 
of scientifically valid predictions. In his sociological analysis, he links the 
precautionary logic to a loss of faith in the modern ideal of creating a better 
world through human intervention. In this sense, the precautionary logic, 
according to Furedi, signifies a loss of faith in the human capacity to do 
good.10 Whereas people in the 20th century embraced modern utopias, in the 
21st century we seem to focus on post-modern dystopias. From this 
perspective, the threat of terrorism is even quite small compared to the 
climate crisis that global warming is thought to have in store for us.  
Like Furedi, Hanekamp offers an explicitly critical analysis of 
precautionary logic. His analysis contains two important themes. The first is 
a search for the historical roots of precaution. In writing on the need for 
precaution with regard to environmental degradation, it is common to refer 
to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.11 Hanekamp shows, however, that two 
years before Carson published her criticism of the use of nuclear energy and 
pesticides, Herman Kahn wrote On Thermonuclear War, which for instance 
popularised the term ‘megadeath’.12 Kahn tried to develop ways of 
anticipating the Soviet nuclear threat. In this endeavor he ‘believe[s] not 
only the impossible and the improbable, but also the implausible, the 
unlikely, and the unproven.’ Such statements show that Rumsfeld’s 
infamous statement on ‘unknown unknowns’ that we have to take into 
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account when dealing with terrorist threats has a renowned pedigree. This 
kind of reasoning is a clear example of Furedi’s ‘possibilistic thinking’. In 
fact, Kahn goes beyond ‘possibilism’ by believing even the impossible. 
Hanekamp’s other theme is the relation between science and policy. 
He criticises authors who stress the limited value of scientific knowledge and 
plead for citizen participation. In his view, this kind of precautionary logic is 
strongly connected with utopian attempts to control the future. From this 
perspective, the attempts to create a sustainable future by foreseeing and 
forestalling all possible environmental threats are not different from Kahn’s 
attempt to foresee and forestall all possible Soviet nuclear threats. By 
surpassing the scientific domain of theoretically validated and interpreted 
facts and entering the domain of the possible, the improbable, and the 
unknown, we contribute to the erosion of science. We do this by ignoring the 
‘tentative, exploratory, [and] questioning’ character of science in our quest 
to find a certain and secure future that takes us beyond what we can reliably 
know. 
Arnoldussen also offers a critical analysis of precautionary logic. His 
analysis is philosophical in nature. He identifies several ‘absolute 
presuppositions’ that can be found in all precautionary reasoning. These 
suppositions are absolute in that they are never questioned but always 
implicitly assumed to be self-evident truths. Like Furedi, Arnoldussen 
concludes that the suppositions of precaution stand in stark contrast to those 
of the Enlightenment. Along this historical line, he points to parallels 
between precaution and the religiously inspired philosophy of several church 
fathers from the Middle Ages. From this analysis, Arnoldussen draws the 
tentative conclusion that precautionary policies will tend to be of a moderate 
nature. Starting from the presupposition of the fragility of nature, 
humankind, and society, precaution will tend to warn us to be moderate and 
not to upset ‘natural balances’. Arnoldussen postulates that precautionary 
policies therefore will be of a moderate nature as well.  
All of the contributions offer an analysis of a different aspect of 
precaution. In conclusion, I want to offer some thoughts on what may be 
called the hermeneutic aspect of precaution. Whenever precaution is 
advocated, we tend to find remarks about the increased complexity and 
uncertainty of the reality we face in our time. For the most part, the claim is 
made that the nature of the world itself has changed: our social, economic, 
and political reality has become more complex and uncertain. Less often the 
claim is made that our attitude towards the world has changed. Because of 
this change of perspective, the world appears to be more complex and 
uncertain. And as our perspective determines our actions, the increased 
complexity and uncertainty we ascribe to the world actually is the result of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.  
The view that the nature of the world itself has changed seems 
hardly convincing. Think of the position Alexander the Great, Charlemagne, 
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or Philip II of Spain were in. Whenever they left their palaces they entered 
uncertain territory. This condition began as soon as they left their homes and 
became worse the further away that they moved. Even palaces themselves 
were not always safe for rulers. The question is whether we leave our homes 
with an optimistic sense of adventure or with a sense of dread. Do we 
venture out for the purpose of advancing the quality of our lives or for the 
purpose of guarding ourselves against threats that have remained hidden thus 
far?  
The change in dominant cultural outlook pointed to by Furedi and 
Arnoldussen brings us to the second possibility. It is not so much that the 
world has changed but that we approach the world with a different attitude. 
It would be interesting to explore the role scientists and philosophers – or 
intellectuals in general – have played in this change. Peter Bernstein showed 
in Against the Gods how the idea of ‘risk’ gradually was picked up in 
political, economic, and legal practices.13 This changed those practices for 
good. In a similar way, it is important to write the remarkable history of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty has certainly become a true buzzword among 
scientists today.14 As a working title for such a history, I suggest Against all 
Odds.
The ‘post-modern’ turn in the appreciation of science will probably 
have a prominent place in this history. Proponents of precaution often 
criticise the arrogance of scientists and stress the limited value of scientific 
knowledge.15 And in a sense they are right; it is true that all received 
scientific knowledge is ‘valid through’ today. However, the more we seek 
security for a future that is further away from us, the more we encounter 
uncertainty. In this way, precautionary academic writing takes us away from 
what we can know with reasonable certainty. In encouraging us to ensure a 
sustainable world for our grandchildren – and for theirs – precautionary logic 
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urges us to try to foresee and to forestall problems that could arise in the 
long term. Climate models typically have a time horizon of one or two 
centuries. Herman Kahn too wrote a book on the next two hundred years.16 
The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy urges us in 
Uncertain Security to take uncertainty seriously.17 For the Council, this 
means that we need to look beyond what we know or can predict with 
reasonable certainty. It is difficult to see how this could lead to anything but 
speculation. However, if we refrain from attempting to control the future and 
settle for piecemeal engineering, taking uncertainty seriously can also be 
understood as a plea to accept that the validity of all knowledge is limited.18
Such acceptance should lead us to lower our aspirations in trying to create a 
‘sustainable’ world.  
All future generations will eventually and inevitably face their own 
‘present’. Perhaps the best we can do is to make sure that our children are 
well educated and have sufficient resources to effectively face the dangers 
they are sure to come up against. Many of these dangers are not known by us 
nor can they be known now. The realm of the known and the unknown 
unknowns is out there, and it will always remain beyond our present grasp. 
Accepting this is a cultural change that seems hardly possible, given the 
vested interest many institutions and scientists now have in the existence of 
an uncertain future. However, the precautionary turn that started in the 1960s 
and 1970s was also thought to be impossible, as it went against many of the 
dominant interests of that time.19 To answer Vlek’s final question: I do feel 
that hope is a better counsellor than fear.  
Roel Pieterman 
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